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Abstract 
Current European consumer law mainly acts on the assumption that people behave in line 
with the ‘rational man’ (homo oeconomicus), who has stable preferences and can absorb 
all available information and process as well as integrate it into her consumer decisions. 
This assumption has been challenged by findings of behavioral sciences such as behavioral 
economics, psychology and neurosciences. This article examines if and how findings from 
behavioral research are in a position to advance European consumer contract law 
(mandatory law in general as well as information duties, standard terms and rights to 
withdraw in specific). 
Das Europäische Verbraucherschutzrecht stützt sich in weiten Teilen auf das ökonomische 
Menschenbild des homo oeconomicus. Dieser verfügt über stabile Präferenzen und kann 
unbegrenzt Informationen aufnehmen sowie diese in seinen Entscheidungsprozess 
integrieren. Dieses Menschenbild wurde durch Forschungsergebnisse in Verhaltens-
ökonomik, Psychologie und Gehirnforschung in Frage gestellt. Der Aufsatz geht der Frage 
nach, inwieweit das Verbrauchervertragsrecht (in Form von zwingendem Recht, vor-
vertraglichen Informationspflichten, Fairnesskontrolle Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen 
und Widerrufsrechten) von Erkenntnissen dieser sog Verhaltensforschung profitieren kann. 
Subjects: consumer law; behavioral sciences; behavioral economics; mandatory law; 
information duties; standard terms; right to withdraw.  
I. Introduction
Consumers regularly are in a weaker position than their entrepreneurial counterpart when 
concluding contracts as regards their bargaining power and level of knowledge about the 
product or service and its market. The rules of consumer contract law aim to 
counterbalance this disequilibrium and protect consumers’ health, wealth and freedom of 
decision-making. In doing so consumer contract law tries to steer the behavior of 
consumers and businesses.  
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The recent strand of economic research called behavioral economics takes into 
consideration empirical findings, mostly from psychology,1 showing that persons (with full 
capacity) do not always act rationally when making decisions. These regular deviations 
from the neo-classical model of homo oeconomicus are called (cognitive) biases. 
Psychologists have discovered that people take decisions in two different ways, also 
referred to as system 1 and system 2, respectively.2 System 1 reacts fast, uncontrolled, 
unconscious and effortless, using rules of thumb (called heuristics) and is sometimes 
biased. System 2, in contrast, takes more mental capacity and is slower. It takes decisions 
through deliberation and calculation. 
In search of more effective ways of regulating markets, the European Commission relies on 
behavioral sciences.3 Since 2010 it has had a framework contract with five research 
consultancies, which allows all services of the institution to commission behavioral 
studies.4 In fall 2013, the Commission issued a policy brief dedicated to ‘Applying 
Behavioral Sciences to EU Policy-making’.5 In consumer law, however, behavioral research 
still plays a minor role and the US-American academic discussion as well as political 
practice remain well ahead. 
Integrating behavioral research into consumer law means testing existing rules against the 
empirically proven reality of consumer behavior and suggesting alternative rules which 
respond better to the respective protective needs and goals. The decision whether and to 
what extent consumers should be protected remains with the national and/or European 
legislators. 
The main benefit of integrating behavioral insights into consumer law is that rules which 
take into account people’s actual behavior rather than merely relying on economic models 
are more likely to attain the policy goal of protecting the presumably weaker party to a 
contract. Using the methods of behavioral research can inform the legislative process and 
                                                             
* Ass.-Prof. Dr. Eva Maria Tscherner, Dipl (Strasbourg), Institut für Zivilrecht, Ausländisches und Internationales 
Privatrecht, Universität Graz.  
1 Social and cognitive psychology deal with contractual behavior of people. Research about judgment and decision 
making is particularly interesting from the perspective of consumer law.  
2 Sunstein, Simple(r). The Future of Government (2013) 42 et seq; Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011); Ariely, 
Predictably Irrational (2008); Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning and Judgment, and Social Cognition, 
Annual Review of Psychology (2008) 255; Shiv/Fedorikhin, Spontaneous Versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-
Based Affect on Choice Behavior, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2002) 342; Shiv/Fedorikhin, 
Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making, Journal of Consumer 
Research (1999) 278; Chaiken/Liberman/Eagly, Heuristic and Systematic Processing Within and Beyond the Persuasion 
Context, in Uleman/Bargh (eds), Unintended Thought (1989) 215. 
3 On 30th September 2013, the Commission hosted its third conference on behavioral sciences that gathered around 
300 stakeholders in Brussels. The conference’s aim was to present first results of integrating behavioral sciences into 
the Commission’s policy proposals and to discuss the promises and limitations of this new approach.  
4 For a study on the Standardized Information Notice for consumers proposed in the Common European Sales Law 
see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/cesl_gallup_consortium_final_report_en.pdf 
(29.09.2014).  
5 http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/applying-behavioural-sciences-to-eu-policy-making-pbLBNA26033/ (29.09.2014). 
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make it more effective. With the help of randomized controlled trials (RCT), a legislative 
intervention’s impact on the behavior of market participants can be tested. This allows 
scientific prediction of law’s effects and thereby positions lawmakers in a situation where 
they can choose from regulatory tools, the effectiveness of which has been tested in 
advance.6  
Behavioral analysis of law does not necessarily direct proposed legislation into a particular 
(political) direction.7 In its pure ‘positive’ version, it describes (legally relevant) human 
behavior and does not prescribe how human behavior should be.8 In its ‘prescriptive’ 
version, it shows how society might reach commonly agreed goals.9 This viewpoint focuses 
on effective tools of regulation and will be adopted throughout this article. The ‘normative’ 
version of behavioral analysis of law10 promotes the idea that governments should 
intervene and guide people’s behavior wherever they underlie biases and otherwise would 
take decisions that are not in their own best interest. When intervening, governments 
should interfere with people’s freedom of choice as little as possible and therefore this 
form of paternalism is called ‘libertarian paternalism’.11 The preferred form of intervention 
are ‘nudges’,12 such as cleverly set default rules, which guide people’s behavior in a certain 
decision without forbidding any choices or changing their economic incentives in an 
important way. Ever since libertarian paternalism and nudging were promoted by Thaler 
and Sunstein, there has a debate been going on about how desirable this form of 
governmental intervention is.13 Although this debate has to be kept in mind when 
proposing behaviorally informed tools of consumer protection, this article will not expand 
on the topic.14 
The main regulatory tools currently used in private law to achieve consumer protection are 
mandatory rules, information duties, the judicial review of (standard) terms used by 
businesses and a consumer’s right to withdraw from certain contracts. These four core 
protection mechanisms will now be looked at from a behavioral research point of view. 
 
                                                             
6 Abramowicz/Ayres/Listokin, Randomizing Law, Pennsylvania Law Review 2011, 929; Sunstein, Empirically Informed 
Regulation, Chicago Law Review 2011, 1349. 
7 Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, Haifa Law Review 2008, 314 et seq. 
8 Fleischer/Schmolke/Zimmer, Verhaltensökonomik als Forschungsinstrument für das Wirtschaftsrecht, in 
Fleischer/Zimmer (eds), Beitrag der Verhaltensökonomie (Behavioral Economics) zum Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 
(2011) 9 (46). 
9 Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, Chicago Law Review 1997, 1175. 
10 The normative behavioral analysis of law differs from the normative economic analysis of law, which seeks to attain 
an efficient allocation of economic resources. 
11 Sunstein/Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism, American Economic Review 2003, 175; Sunstein/Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, Chicago Law Review 2003, 1159. 
12 Thaler/Sunstein, Nudge (2008). 
13 G. Mitchell, Libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron, Northwestern University Law Review 2005, 1245; Rebonato, 
Taking Liberties. A Critical Examination of Libertarian Paternalism (2012). 
14 But see Lurger, Empirism and Private Law: Behavioral Research as Part of a Legal Empirical Governance Analysis 
and a Form of New Legal Realism, Austrian Law Journal 1/2014, 20.  
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II. Mandatory law 
Most consumer protection rules are mandatory law, such as pre-contractual information 
duties, the ban on unfair terms and withdrawal rights. As opposed to default rules (also 
called non-mandatory law), mandates are a very strong mechanism of consumer 
protection.  
Defaults are rules that apply when consumers or citizens do not make an active choice. 
They are either set by private or by public institutions and, while not restricting the 
freedom to choose, have an important influence on decision making as people tend to stick 
with the pre-selected option. This is mainly caused by three reasons: Choosing the default 
does not require any physical action and can free from laborious calculation (inertia and 
procrastination). This goes hand in hand with the finding that individuals have a tendency 
to prefer the status quo to alternatives, all the rest being equal (status quo bias).15 The 
second reason is that decision-makers infer that the default has been chosen for a reason, 
be it its merit or the desires of the choice architects (endorsement).16 Finally, the default 
option presents a reference point (or anchor), based on which decision-makers evaluate 
other options as gains or losses.17 
Legislators can either intervene in protecting market participants from defaults set by 
other market participants (mandatory law) or set defaults themselves by enacting non-
mandatory rules. An example for a default set by private institutions is a pre-checked box 
when purchasing online. Almost everybody has experienced a situation in which, while 
buying flight tickets, the operator tried to add travel insurance to the shopping basket by 
pre-checking the box indicating “Yes, I want to buy travel insurance”. The EU wanted to 
reduce this practice causing (sometimes useless) extra costs for consumers and limited the 
use of pre-checked boxes in Art 22 of the regulation on the rights of consumers.18 
According to that provision, traders shall seek the express consent of the consumer to any 
extra payment in addition to the remuneration agreed upon for the trader’s main 
contractual obligation. It is not considered to be the consumer’s express consent if the 
trader has inferred it by using default options which the consumer is required to reject in 
order to avoid the additional payment. If the trader still uses pre-checked boxes, the 
consumer has the right to reimbursement of the additional payment. 
A prominent example of a default set by the state is organ donation. It makes a big 
difference to the number of donated organs whether people have to become active in 
                                                             
15 Korobkin, The status quo bias and contract default rules, Cornell Law Review 1998, 608 (612). 
16 McKenzie/Liersch/Finkelstein, Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults, Psychological Science 2006, 414. 
17 Dinner et al, Partitioning Default Effects. Why People Choose Not to Choose, Journal of Experimental Psychology 
Applied 2011, 332. 
18 Dir 2011/83/EU on consumer rights OJ 2011/304, 64; for an expressed reference to behavioral insights see 
ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/docs/30092013_jrc_scientific_policy_report_en.pdf 8 
(29.09.2014). For flight tickets see also Art 23 Reg (EC) 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in 
the Community OJ 2008/293, 3 and CJEU C-112/11, ebookers. 
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order to be an organ donator (opt-in) or they automatically are an organ donator and have 
to opt out of the system if they do not want to give away their organs.19 Another default set 
by public institutions are non-mandatory provisions of law.20 In contract law, the setup of 
default rules shape ultimate contractual outcomes.21 While not having the same clout as 
mandatory rules, default rules shape market participants’ perception about and often are 
applied to market transactions and therefor need to be designed carefully.  
 
III. Information Duties 
Current European consumer law mostly tries to eliminate market inequalities between 
businesses and consumers by prescribing far-reaching information duties.22 The rationale 
for this is that businesses have numerous pieces of information about the offered product 
or service and its market. Consumers would face costs to attain this information. In order 
to counterbalance this information asymmetry, the European legislator obliges businesses 
to give consumers all the relevant details about the product or service as well as the 
proposed contract (standard terms, see IV) prior to the conclusion of the contract. 
Consumers then can compare offers and make the best deal, which means that they 
purchase the good or service that best matches their preferences.  
This so-called information paradigm in European contract law ties up with the rationale of 
the internal market. Obliging businesses to provide information only interferes little with 
businesses’ market freedoms and usually does not produce high costs for them. At the 
same time, it preserves consumers’ autonomy as it respects their freedom of choice. 
Consumers shall be put into a position where they can make an ‘informed choice’ taking 
advantage of the internal market’s competition among businesses.23 
Behavioral insights show that too much information is useless for consumers. Due to 
limited cognitive capacities (as well as time) people are not able to absorb all the 
information provided (information24 or cognitive25 overload). Furthermore, when 
processing information, they underlie biases, which sometimes lead to sub-optimal 
                                                             
19 Johnson/Goldstein, Do defaults save lives? Science 2003, 1338. 
20 Korobkin, Cornell Law Review 1998, 608. 
21 Tor, Haifa Law Review 2008, 267. 
22 See eg Art 5 and 6 Dir 2011/83/EU on consumer rights OJ 2011/304, 64. 
23 Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill (eds), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (2001); 
Rischkowsky/Döring, Consumer Policy in a Market Economy, Journal of Consumer Policy 2008, 285 (287 et seq). 
24 Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity For Processing Information, 
Psychol Rev 1956, 81; Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, Journal of Consumer Research 1984, 432; 
Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, Journal of Consumer 
Research 1984, 436; Schwartz et al, Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness is a Matter of Choice, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 2002, 1178; Byung-Kwan Lee/Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information Overload on 
Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, Psychology & Marketing 2004, 159. 
25 Sasaki/Becker/Janssen/Neel, Does greater product information actually inform consumer decision? The relationship 
between product information quantity and diversity of consumer decisions, Journal of Economic Psychology 2011, 
391 (392). 
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purchase decisions. Human decision making is influenced by (mental) anchors that may be 
set in a completely different setting (anchoring), by the order of options (framing) and the 
presentation of equal options as gains or losses (loss aversion), to only name a few of 
them. People have difficulties making accurate predictions about the future as they tend to 
over-estimate their own capacities as well as the course of their lives (over-optimism) and 
value identical things differently if they possess them as compared to when they have to 
acquire them (endowment effect). In other words, people tend to distort information, 
ignore or misuse it when making choices. Finally, it is a lack of well-developed26 and/or 
stable27 preferences that can keep people from using (disclosed) information effectively.  
Lawmakers thus face a big challenge: Incomplete disclosure leaves consumers ignorant, 
complete disclosure overwhelms them. Due to the internet, the amount of information 
about a product’s or service’s different features and qualities have increased enormously. 
Comparison shopping sites and user comments increase attribute information to an extent 
that may exceed the individual’s cognitive capacity to process this information. As a result, 
choosing the most popular item becomes more likely, thereby relying on other people’s 
choices (social learning). A greater amount of information may therefore lead to 
consumers’ decisions becoming less diverse in the sense that more consumers choose the 
same product or service.28  
A solution to this challenge could be to cut down the amount of information and to frame29 
it in an adequate manner.30 Framing is the presentation and setup of information and 
choices. Legislators determine what information has to be given and the way this has to be 
done and in that respect are choice architects31. By setting up rules, they try to guide 
people’s behavior in a direction. An example for a public policy goal that seeks to be 
attained through mechanisms of private law is to reduce over-indebtedness.32 
Behavioral researchers suggest several ways to advance (mandated) disclosure.33 They 
point at simplified, standardized and comparative disclosure, vivid disclosure and social 
                                                             
26 Ben-Shahar/Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 647 (2011) 
101 (178 et seq). 
27 Grüne-Yanoff/Hansson (eds), Preference Change (2009). 
28 Sasaki/Becker/Janssen/Neel, Journal of Economic Psychology 2011, 391.  
29 Tversky/Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science 1981, 453; Tversky/Kahneman, 
Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, Journal of Business 1986, 251; Stocké, Framing und Rationalität: Die 
Bedeutung der Informationsdarstellung für das Entscheidungsverhalten (2002). 
30 Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (2013) 50. 
31 Thaler/Sunstein, Nudge (2008) 11 et seq., 81 et seq. 
32 For a field experiment with regard to payday borrowing see Bertrand/Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive 
Biases, and Payday Borrowing, The Journal of Finance 2011, 1865. Reinforcing the adding-up dollar fees and 
comparing it to the equivalent fees for borrowing the same amount on a credit card reduced the take-up of future 
payday loans by 11% in the subsequent four months. 
33 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, in contrast, propose to give up mandated disclosure all together; Ben-Shahar/Schneider, 
More than you wanted to know. The failure of mandated disclosure (2014). 
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comparison information.34 Another recommendation is to oblige businesses to give simple 
as well as more elaborated information directed at different audiences (consumers and 
intermediaries) and/or to involve information intermediaries (advice, counselling) into the 
process of decision making.35 More elaborated information could be given in the form of 
individualized information about a client’s past usage of a certain service (use-pattern 
information for mobile phoning, energy supply etc).36  
However, increasing the prominence of some aspects of information through 
standardization and framing might reduce consumers’ understanding or recall of other 
truthful information and thereby lead to worse decisions rather than better ones as it may 
induce consumers to overestimate prominent information.37 Hence, the proposed 
improvements of current informational regulation need to be tested empirically in order to 
anticipate their (side-) effects. 
In European consumer credit law the idea of standardized information has already been 
taken up in the form of the Standard European Consumer Credit Information38 and the 
European Standardized Information Sheet (ESIS) for credit agreements for consumers 
relating to residential immovable property.39 Standardizing information helps to compare 
offers. The structure of the forms frames the given information and draws consumers’ 
attention on certain pieces of (important) information. 
One of the first studies carried out within the European Commission’s framework contract 
mentioned above focused on retail investment services.40 As part of the study, three 
experiments on investment decisions were carried out. The main findings (e.g. simplifying 
and standardizing product information can significantly improve investment decisions) of 
the study were only published after the Commission’s proposal on a regulation on key 
information documents for investment products.41 Still the proposal is in line with the 
findings and therefore the study is expected to support the proposal within the legislative 
process. 
                                                             
34 Loewenstein/Sunstein/Golman, Disclosure. Psychology Changes Everything, Harvard Public Law Working Paper 13-30, 
forthcoming in the Annual Review of Economics 2014. 
35 Stark/Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to 
Prevent Predatory Lending, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 2010, 85; Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents, and 
Consumer Protection, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 2011, 56; Ben-Shahar/Schneider, More than 
you wanted to know. The failure of mandated disclosure (2014) 188. 
36 Bar-Gill/Ferrari, Informing Consumers about Themselves, in Ogus/van Boom (eds), Juxtaposing Autonomy and 
Paternalism in Private Law (2011) 175; Bar-Gill/Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 
American Law and Economics Review 2012 14/1, 235. 
37 Craswell, Taking Information Seriously. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 
Virginia Law Review 2006, 565 (584); Sunstein, The Council of Psychological Advisers, SSRN 2014, 25. 
38 Annex II of Dir 2008/48/EC on credit agreements for consumers OJ L 2008/133, 66. 
39 Annex II of Dir 2014/17/EU on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property OJ L 
2014/60, 34. 
40 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf (29.09.2014). 
41 COM(2012) 352. 
ALJ 1/2014 Can behavioral research advance mandatory law, information duties,  
 standard terms and withdrawal rights? 
 
 
   
151 
IV. Standard Terms 
Sellers regularly make use of standard terms, which is a pre-drafted (by sellers) set of 
clauses specifying the contracting parties’ rights and duties. Standard terms allow mass 
marketing as sellers do not have to negotiate terms individually each time before 
concluding a contract (one-size-fits-all agreements). They form part of the contract, which is 
why consumers have to agree to the seller’s standard terms. 
The EU-legislator has already surrendered the hope that consumers would actually read 
the numerous terms drafted in legalese each time before contracting. This is the reason 
why these terms not only become part of the parties’ contract when consumers have 
actually read and assented to them, but also when they were given the opportunity to read 
them prior to contracting and chose to accept them without reading.42 This often leads to 
the ‘signing without reading’-phenomenon. 
In EU law, the system of mandated contract disclosure is supplemented by a ban of certain 
(unfair) standard contract terms in consumer contracts.43 In order to foster consumer 
protection, the CJEU (by way of interpreting the unfair terms directive) obliges national 
judges to check the fairness of terms not only if it is invoked by the parties but ex officio.44 
Furthermore, the court set an incentive for businesses not to use ambiguous terms by 
forbidding national judges to revise the content of a term they deemed to be void.45 Hence, 
if a term is considered to be unfair by a national judge, this term will be void as a whole. 
The European rules on unfair terms create a system of consumer protection. In the US, 
such a comprehensive system does not exist. Therefore, (behaviorally informed) legal 
literature makes propositions on how to improve consumer protection regarding unfair 
terms. These propositions might give inputs for the amendment for the European system 
and hence are sketched out in this article in addition to suggestions of European authors. 
Mentioning them does, however, not suggest that the European system should be 
substituted by the US-American.  
In 2007, US-American researchers tracked the behavior of 45,091 households with respect 
to 66 online software companies to study how many potential buyers access the 
companies’ standard terms (called end user license agreements, EULAs). The results of the 
study indicate that EULAs were accessed in only 55 of the 120,545 visits of a company’s 
homepage, this being 0.05% of all such visits. This number is striking and confirms the 
impression that ‘no one ever reads the fine print’. The study’s results become even more 
                                                             
42 Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the 'Opportunity to Read' in Contract Law, European Review of Contract Law 2009, 1. 
43 Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts; for an excellent overview of the recent case law see 
Micklitz/Reich, The Court and the Sleeping Beauty. The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, CMLRev 2014, 
771. 
44 CJEU C-137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, ECR 2010 I-10847 para 49; C-618/10, Banco Espanol de Credito paras 42 et seq; C-
415/11, Aziz, para 46. 
45 C-618/10, Banco Espanol de Credito para 58 et seq. 
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staggering if one considers that the average time spent on the EULA page was 47.7 
seconds. This of course is not enough to grasp even small parts of the EULA.46 Further 
research on that topic revealed that the prominence (e.g. browsewraps or clickwraps) of 
the disclosed terms has little effect on readership. Moreover, those consumers who read 
terms were equally likely to purchase the product regardless of their one-sidedness.47 An 
explanation for this could be that people are over-optimistic about their own lives and thus 
underestimate the chance that terms they agreed to will ever gain relevance in a dispute.48 
Two European authors, Luth and Faure, argue for more substantive control of standard 
terms.49 They sympathize with an (ex ante or ex post) administrative control or negotiating 
model forms of standard terms through business and consumer representatives.50 These 
control mechanisms would have to take place at a national level, as union-wide (sector-
specific) standard terms are not feasible at the moment due to a lack of full-harmonization 
of the unfair terms directive.51 As such national measures would impede commerce within 
the internal market they are rather unlikely to be adopted. 
Taking up the idea that consumers do not learn about the content of terms via reading 
them (all), the US-American authors Ayres and Schwartz tested the premise that consumers 
acquire substantial information about terms through their own past experience, through 
learning from each other, advice from experts, the Internet, and the like. A study about 
consumer expectations about Facebook EULAs validated this premise.52 However, 
consumers are sometimes over-optimistic about important terms (term optimism). This is 
why the authors suggest that businesses (regularly) have to find out which terms their 
consumers optimistically mistake in order to correct these mistakes with vivid disclosure in 
the form of standardized warning boxes (a process which they call term substantiation). 
Such warning boxes should ideally contain only the (five or even less) most unfavorable 
and unexpected terms of a contract. This technique of disclosure has the benefit of not 
overloading consumers with information while at the same time giving them a realistic 
picture of unexpected terms. However, it causes considerable costs for businesses. 
A follow-up study showed that disclosure in warning boxes improved consumer 
understanding of contract terms by 9-10%.53 It also revealed that more warnings (six in 
comparison to three disclosed terms) do not necessarily imply greater understanding. At 
                                                             
46 Bakos/Marotta-Wurgler/Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper 2009/40, 
26. 
47 Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter? Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 2012, 94. 
48 Radin, Boilerplate (2014) 12, 27. 
49 Luth, Behavioural Economics and Consumer Policy. The economic analysis of standard terms in consumer contracts 
revisited (2010); Faure/Luth, Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms, Journal of Consumer Policy 2011, 337. 
50 On the latter see also Collins, The Freedom to Circulate Documents. Regulating Contracts in Europe, European Law 
Journal 2004, 787; Ben-Shahar, European Review of Contract Law 2009, 1. 
51 Riegel, Einheitliche unionsweite Geschäftsbedingungen für Verbraucherverträge. Lässt sich dieses Ziel 
verwirklichen? (2013). 
52 Ayres/Schwartz, The No Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, Stanford Law Review 2014, 545 (600). 
53 Mitts, How Effective is Mandatory Disclosure? 2014 (available on SSRN).  
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the same time, too many warnings drove consumers away from warned-of firms, this result 
suggesting that consumers reject otherwise beneficial transactions merely out of a distaste 
for the warnings.  
Ben-Shahar proposes two innovative kinds of private information dissemination on 
standard form contracts: (online) rating and labeling of contracts.54 Consumers often have 
a look at standard terms only after concluding the contract, when a conflict with the 
business arises. Via online product rating websites these consumers could convey their 
knowledge about standard terms to prospective consumers, which could discipline 
sellers.55 However, an empirical study from 2010 testing this assumption reveals that highly 
rated products often have seller-friendly terms.56 This may result from the fact that 
experienced buyers rate products not based on contract terms (or only attribute them a 
minor role in their rating) but on other attributes. These attributes may be offset with pro-
seller contract terms.57 Another drawback of online consumer ratings is that they can be 
manipulated by businesses themselves, even though rating websites try to minimize such 
fake reviews.58 
 
V. Withdrawal Rights 
EU law grants consumers a right to withdraw from certain types of contracts (such as 
consumer credit and timesharing) as well as contracts concluded under special 
circumstances (doorstep and distance selling). Within a so-called cooling-off period, 
consumers can refrain from such contracts without giving a reason, this being an exception 
to the general principle of sanctity of contracts. The cooling-off period allows consumers to 
(1) think over complicated and costly contracts that are usually not concluded on a regular 
basis, (2) learn about and test products purchased via the internet or other forms of 
distance selling and (3) reassess purchase decisions induced by sellers (doorstep selling). 
Existing withdrawal rights within EU legislation are designed in a way that consumers have 
to act in order to withdraw from a contract (opt-out).59 
                                                             
54 Ben-Shahar, European Review of Contract Law 2009, 1; on the latter see also Becher, A 'Fair Contracts' Approval 
Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42  University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform 2009, 747. 
55 Becher/Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0. Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 2008, 3. 
56 Chari, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms Through Online Information Flows. An Empirical Study, NYU Law 
Review 2010, 1618; the comparison sites tested were Epinions.com and Amazon.com. 
57 Chari, NYU Law Review 2010, 1644.  
58 Chari, NYU Law Review 2010, 1636; on fake reviews also see Malbon, Taking Fake Online Consumer Reviews 
Seriously, Journal of Consumer Policy 2013, 139; on an attempt to increase comparison sites’ quality through 
changing the way they are financed see Gamper, How Can Internet Comparison Sites Work Optimally for Consumers, 
Journal of Consumer Policy 2012, 333. 
59 Kalss/Lurger, Rücktrittsrechte (2001); on the European legislation as compared to the US-American and the 
economic foundation of the right to withdraw see Ben-Shahar/Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, Journal 
of Legal Studies 2011, 115. 
ALJ 1/2014 Can behavioral research advance mandatory law, information duties,  
 standard terms and withdrawal rights? 
 
 
   
154 
There is currently a dearth of statistical data indicating how many consumers actually make 
use of their withdrawal right.60 Within legal literature estimations on the subject differ: 
Some authors believe that the right to withdraw is used very often thereby serving the 
clever consumer, who can still abstain from the contract after having made a price 
comparison.61 Others believe that consumers rarely make use of their withdrawal right, 
even if it has become clear to them within the cooling-off period that they do not want to 
be bound by the contract.62 
Behavioral studies show that people tend to stick to a decision previously taken, which 
supports the hypothesis that people make use of their withdrawal rights less often than 
would be beneficial for them. People have a tendency to disregard information that 
conflicts with decisions taken in the past in order to minimize so called cognitive 
dissonances.63 The status quo bias, endowment effect, loss aversion, regret avoidance64 
and the sunk cost fallacy65 could foster behavior that makes people refrain from using their 
withdrawal rights effectively.66 
Instead of the existing system of opting-out from the contract, Hoeppner67 and Rehberg68 
suggest to introduce an opting-in rule. This means that consumers would have to act if they 
want to hold on to the contract after the cooling-off period has expired (e.g. confirmation 
that the consumer wants to be bound by the contract). This regulatory setup would 
certainly mitigate cognitive dissonances to a certain extent. It is, however, doubtful if 
consumers are aware of the legal construction of the right to withdraw and to what extent 
a change would induce different consumer behavior. Furthermore, at least in distance 
selling, most of the biases mentioned earlier would still occur due to the fact that 
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2013, 9. 
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consumers need to physically acquire the product during the cooling-off period. It is thus 
necessary to test empirically the effects of possible changes to the right to withdraw.69 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This article has shown that studying human decision-making in an interdisciplinary way can 
advance consumer contract law. It has pointed out where European legislation already 
takes into consideration behavioral research and illustrated where (existing) behavioral 
findings can be useful for mandatory law in general as well as information duties, standard 
terms and withdrawal rights in particular. The challenge for the future will be to conduct 
behavioral research within settings relevant for law, which means proposing legislation 
fitting within the existing system of European consumer contract law and then testing it 
empirically in order to find out the actual effects of the policy recommendation.  
 
                                                             
69 See also Luzak, Journal of Consumer Policy 2014, 109. 
